Designing to CALEA Specs

Modern-day crime fighters say the digitalization of communications will make it more difficult to catch the bad guys. Criminals are using wireless phones and the Internet more than ever. What we need is a law requiring FBI-friendly networks that not only ensure the ability to "wiretap" suspected felons, but to track them down as well.

Civil liberties watchdog groups are up in arms. They fear proposed CALEA requirements would violate the right to privacy.

Lost in the debate are a couple of weightier questions. Can anyone really force felons to use FBI-approved products and services? And what will CALEA's impact be on vendors' ability to develop and manufacture products responsive to customers' needs and global competition?

Government policy-makers argue that criminals have access to more and better technologies, while police officers and FBI agents are falling behind. But it isn't clear that the solution is to burden the entire wireless industry with a laundry list of technical requirements.

It seems that the proposed CALEA standards are based on the assumption that criminals will continue to use wireless phone services "as is," even after they have been modified to help law enforcement agencies listen to their conversations and track their movements.

It also seems that the only way to prevent criminals from exploiting "better, cheaper" consumer technologies would be to start taking them away from everyone. Ominously, this is precisely what proposed CALEA standards would do. Forcing the U.S. wireless industry to implement the notorious "punch list" would tie up resources that otherwise would have been devoted to developing consumer-oriented products and features. CALEA implementation, even if government-subsidized, will almost certainly slow the introduction of new products.

There are more pernicious, if subtle, threats. What if entrenched vendors actually embrace proposed CALEA standards? In exchange for serving the public interest by implementing what everyone agrees are profitless features, vendors would receive what amounts to government protection. But history shows that vendors selling to protected markets become less interested in technical innovation and more interested in just hanging on.

It took the FCC decades to learn that although it is tempting to impose what experts think is the best technical solution, it's better to let the market decide. But many people insist public safety is an exception. They argue that the free market, acting on its own, is incapable of responding to public safety needs. But surveys repeatedly have shown that a significant percentage of customers buy wireless phones for personal or family safety. Evidently, customers do think vendors are doing a good job addressing safety needs.

Not to be overlooked is this simple fact: It is only because of the wonderful job the wireless industry has done making wireless communications ubiquitous and affordable that law enforcement authorities now are asking for special portals into wireless networks. But wasn't it government officials, posing as guardians of the public interest, who delayed the introduction of wireless phone service nearly two decades by refusing to allocate the necessary spectrum?

This is not to suggest the wireless industry shouldn't cooperate with law enforcement. Instead of becoming involved in product development, however, CALEA could ensure that wireless manufacturers and carriers provide information regarding specific subscribers, when requested, in a timely manner. Plus, the wireless industry should assist law enforcement agencies in apprehending criminals whenever possible.

CUSTOM EQUIPMENT The best way to turn the tide against criminals is for law enforcement to develop computing and communications products specifically for that task. More powerful means of uncovering evidence (e.g., shoeprints); more reliable means of identifying individuals (e.g., DNA testing); and more effective means of surveillance (e.g., decryption) are a few examples. Although law enforcement has been a pioneering user of wireless data, much more could be done to exploit this emerging technology.

Law enforcement officials perceive digital wireless as a threat. But digital wireless also should be recognized as an opportunity. It will give twice as many consumers -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- instant access to public safety agencies. And it will further empower law enforcement agencies, enabling them to broadcast suspects' photographs to patrol cars, locate officers closest to a crime-in-progress, and thwart criminals attempting to monitor police radio communications.

There is no way to limit what suspected or convicted felons can do with rapidly evolving technology without limiting all consumers. Dictating technical features to the wireless industry is not the solution to the problem. Even if the entire wish list were implemented, it only could be used legitimately against a tiny fraction of subscribers. Even in those cases, there is no guarantee it will prove effective.

The wireless industry's first obligation is to its customers, employees and investors. So far, it has served them well by defining its own products. Law enforcement would be better served to take advantage of what the wireless industry has created without demanding the industry turn its technology inside out as current CALEA proposals suggest.